The Tragedy of
Wounded Knee
The saddest chapter in the history of the West is rife with human error and
misjudgments. These factors were so patently preventable that altering any one
of them might have averted the tragic outcome. This "what if" exercise is
therefore more about what direction one of these changes might have led, than
the obviously desired outcome of averting the massacre entirely.
South Dakota’s Indian reservations - where rations had been reduced and a
recent drought had ruined the year’s crops - were fertile ground for the
messianic message of Paiute Holy Man Wovoka. When the Lakota Sioux of the
newly-minted state of South Dakota embraced the message and its outward
manifestation, the Ghost Dance, state, federal and local officials proceeded
down a path which began in uneasiness and ended in sheer panic.
Pine Ridge Indian Agent H. D. Gallagher, who at least knew something about
the people he worked with, had been replaced by Dr. Daniel F. Royer in October
of 1890, just as the unrest was coming to a head. Royer was not only ignorant
about his new charges, but suffered from extreme paranoia and tended to see
blood-thirsty Indians behind every bush. His increasingly panicky wires to the
Bureau in Washington reflected his ineffectiveness, and of course, the Lakota
knew it.
The problem was exacerbated by the presence of military troops on the
reservation for the first time in ten years (including Custer’s old unit, the
7th Cavalry, which was predictably spoiling for a fight), and the irresponsible
raiding onto the reservation by the civilian "Home Guard", hastily organized on
the orders of Governor Mellette. Led by another hot-head, M.H. Day of Rapid
City, the militia provoked several skirmishes, adding fuel to the fire.
To this add the actual round-up of Big Foot’s Band at Wounded Knee Creek by
inexperienced young troops (witness the placement of Gattling Guns in a
semi-circle on the knoll overlooking the creek - which opens up an entire "what
if" all by itself) and you have a classic recipe for disaster.
The former Pine Ridge Agent, Valentine T. McGillycuddy, was involved
peripherally in the crisis as a colonel on Governor Melette’s military staff
(though he remained in Rapid City). Although highly unpopular during his tenure
as agent, he did understand the Lakota and believed that all the to-ing and fro-ing
by the military and wannabes was contributing to the crisis rather than
forestalling it. "He believed the ghost dance troubles could be settled without
bloodshed and was opposed to bringing troops onto the reservations." General
Miles, who was charged with "the responsibility of restoring tranquility to
Sioux Country" held the politically-appointed Indian Agents in low esteem. He
too felt that placing troops in such a volatile situation was asking for
trouble.
What if McGillycuddy were still the Indian Agent at Pine Ridge during
the fateful winter of 1890-91?
